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CIVIL PROCEDURE-The New Mexico Long-Arm Statute and Due
Process: Beh v. Ostergard, and the Regents of the University of
California

I. INTRODUCTION
In Beh v. Ostergard, and the Regents of the University of California,'

the United States District Court, District of New Mexico, held that publishing the results of allegedly negligent research in New Mexico was
insufficient minimum contact to allow personal jurisdiction over a California doctor and the Regents of the University of California. 2 The court
also held that federal courts sitting in diversity actions have personal
jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the law of the forum state. 3 In
applying New Mexico law, the court discussed several New Mexico cases,
and found some conflicting precedent concerning extra-territorial jurisdiction.' After finding that personal jurisdiction was lacking, the Beh

court dismissed the action rather than transferring it to the proper jurisdiction. 5
The Beh opinion is significant because it clarifies New Mexico law on
personal jurisdiction. While the opinion is not binding on New Mexico
state courts, it is a successful attempt to analyze, apply, and clarify the
apparently inconsistent New Mexico law. This note will discuss personal
jurisdiction through an analysis of the long-arm statute in New Mexico,
and the due process requirement.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 1971, the defendant, Donald Ostergard, was employed by the University of California as Chief of Obstetrics and Gynecology at HarborUCLA Medical Center.6 Dr. Ostergard was also director of the Planned
Parenthood Clinic, which operated in conjunction with Harbor-UCLA. 7
I. 657 F. Supp. 173 (D.N.M. 1987).
2. Id. at 178.
3. Id. at 174, (citing Yarbrough v. Elmer Bunker and Assoc., 669 F.2d 614, 616 (l0th Cir. 1982));
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
4. Compare Winward v. Holly Creek Mills, Inc., 83 N.M. 469,493 P.2d 954(1972); Customwood
Mfg. v. Downey Constr. Co., Inc., 102 N.M. 56, 691 P.2d 57 (1984) and Tarango v. Pastrana, 94
N.M. 727, 616 P.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1980) with Moore v. Graves, 99 N.M. 129, 654 P.2d 582 (Ct.
App. 1982).
5. Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 180.
6. First Amended Complaint at 2.
7. id.
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The plaintiff, Donna Beh, then a California resident, received a Dalkon
Shield intrauterine contraceptive device (I.U.D.) at the Planned Parenthood Clinic.' After moving to New Mexico, Beh developed several complications which led to a hysterectomy.9
The plaintiff filed suit alleging negligence, battery, breach of warranty
and breach of fiduciary duty against Dr. Ostergard.' ° In addition, the
plaintiff filed a claim against Ostergard's employer, the Board of Regents
of the University of California." The claim alleged negligent supervision
and liability was based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.' 2
The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(2), for lack of in personam jurisdiction, and under Rule
12 (b)(6), for eleventh amendment immunity.' 3 The court found that
although the plaintiff met the requirements of the long-arm statute, the
defendants' contacts with New Mexico were insufficient to allow personal
jurisdiction and granted the motion to dismiss. 4 The decision was not
appealed.
I1. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The Beh court had to decide whether it could exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants.' 5 Federal courts, in diversity cases, must
apply the substantive law of the forum state. ' 6 Consequently, the law of
New Mexico had to be applied in this case.
There are three elements of personal jurisdiction in New Mexico.' 7
First, the defendant must commit one of the acts enumerated in the longarm statute. '8 Second, the cause of action must arise from one of the acts
in the long-arm statute.' 9 After the long-arm statute is satisfied, a third
element, which is the constitutional requirement of due process, must be
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 174.
II. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.; Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint at 1. Defendants alleged that Dr. Ostergard
did not have the requisite minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction. Id. They also alleged that
both Dr. Ostergard and the University of California were arms and alter-egos of the state of California
and therefore the action was barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Id.
14. Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 176, 178, 180.
15. Id. at 174.
16. Id. at 174 (citing Yarbrough v. Elmer Bunker and Associates, 669 F.2d 614, 616 (10th Cir.
1982)); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
17. Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 174. The Beh court stated that personal jurisdiction in New Mexico
had three elements. Id. There are two elements in the New Mexico long-arm statute. The third
element is a federal law requirement.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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met.2" While due process is a federal law issue, New Mexico courts must
determine if the defendant has had sufficient minimum contacts with the
forum to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 2"
A. The Defendant Must Commit One of the EnumeratedActs in the
New Mexico Long-Arm Statute.
The New Mexico long-arm statute reads as follows:
A. Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state,
who in person or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated
in this subsection thereby submits himself or his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of
action arising from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; ...
(3) the commission of a tortious act within this state; . . .22
In applying the long-arm statute, the Beh court relied heavily on Tar23 to determine whether a tortious act had been comango v. Pastrana,
mitted in New Mexico.24 In Tarangothe plaintiff received a tubal ligation
in Texas, and subsequently became pregnant when she returned to New
Mexico.25 The Tarango court implied that a tortious act had been committed in New Mexico.26 The Beh court also relied on Peralta v. Martinez, 27 which held that even though a wrongful act may have occurred
elsewhere, a tort is not complete until there is injury. 28 These holdings
are based on the last act doctrine which states that the place of a wrong
is where the last event takes place which is necessary to render the actor
liable. 29 This test had been adopted in Illinois in connection with the
Illinois long-arm statute in Gray v. American Radiator& SanitaryCorp.3 °
New Mexico adopted a long-arm statute which is nearly identical to that
of Illinois. 3' The interpretation of the Illinois statute by Illinois courts is
highly persuasive in New Mexico for that reason.32
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. N.M. STAT. ANN. §38-1-16 (1978).
23. 94 N.M. 727, 616 P.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1980).
24. Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 175; Tarango, 94 N.M. at 728, 616 P.2d at 441.
25. Tarango, 94 N.M. at 728, 616 P.2d at 441.
26. Id.
27. 90 N.M. 391, 564 P.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1977).
28. Id.at 393, 564 P.2d at 196.
29. Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 433-34, 176 N.E.2d 761, 76263 (1961).
30. Id. at 432, 176 N.E.2d at 761.
31. Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 176 (citing Hunter-Hayes Elevator Co. v. Petroleum Club Inn. Co., 77
N.M. 92, 94, 419 P.2d 465, 467 (1966)).
32. Id.
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The federal court applied these holdings to Beh.33 The court determined
that the plaintiff satisfied the first part of the test because the tort occurred
in New Mexico.3" The court reasoned that although the act took place in
California, the injury occurred in New Mexico.35
B. The Cause of Action Must Arise from the Act in the Long-Arm
Statute.
The New Mexico long-arm statute states:
C. Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated in this section
may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction
is based upon this section.36
The federal district court found apparently inconsistent New Mexico
precedent interpreting this section of the long-arm statute. In 1972, the
New Mexico Supreme Court in Winward v. Holly Creek Mills, Inc.37
stated that the purpose of the provision cited above, requiring that the
cause of action arise from one of the acts in the long-arm statute, is to
insure a close connection between the non-resident defendant's jurisdictional activities and the cause of action against which he must defend.38
The federal district court found that in a later case, Moore v. Graves,39
the New Mexico Court of Appeals mischaracterized Holly Creek Mills.'
In 1982, the Moore court stated that a non-resident defendant must avail
himself of the privilege of conducting activities in New Mexico to invoke
the benefits and protection of its laws.' The Moore court further stated
that this activity is not requiredto be directly related to plaintiff's cause
of action as long as there are sufficient contacts.42 Later in 1984, the
New Mexico Supreme Court in Customwood Mfg. v. Downey Construction Co., Inc.43 held that a "single transaction of business within this
State can be sufficient to subject a nonresident defendant to the jurisdiction
of New Mexico courts, provided that the cause of action being sued upon
arises from that particular transaction of business."'
The Beh court suggested that the Holly Creek Mills rule was reinstated
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

657 F. Supp. at 176.

ld.
Id.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16 (1978).
83 N.M. 469, 493 P.2d 954 (1972).
Id. at 471-72, 493 P.2d at 956-57.
99 N.M. 129, 654 P.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1982).
Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 176, n.3.
99 N.M. at 131, 654 P.2d at 584, quoted in Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 176, n.3.
99 N.M. at 131, 654 P.2d at 584 (emphasis added).
102 N.M. 56, 691 P.2d 57 (1984).
Id. at 57, 691 P.2d at 58.
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45
by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Customwood. The Beh court
46
pointed out that the New Mexico Supreme Court cited Moore v. Graves
for the proposition that a single transaction of business was sufficient,
provided the cause of action arose from that particular transaction, despite
Moore.47 Moore and Customwood appear inconthe opposite holding in,
sistent because Moore stated that the activities in New Mexico were not
required to be directly related to the cause of action as long as there were
other sufficient contacts with the state.48 The fact that Moore cited Holly
Creek Mills, and Customwood cited Moore for inconsistent propositions
has undoubtedly led to confusion in New Mexico law. The Beh court
reasoned that in divergity cases it must follow the New Mexico Supreme
5°
49
Court, and held that Holly Creek Mills, as reaffirmed by Customwood,
was the law of New Mexico.'
The Beh court determined that the plaintiff satisfied the second prong
of the test because the cause of action arose from one of the enumerated
acts in the long-arm statute.5" This was a commission of a tortious act in
New Mexico.53 The federal court thus continued its analysis on that

basis."

C. The Defendant Must Have Sufficient Minimum Contacts With the
Forum State to Satisfy the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution.
In determining the type of activity that satisfies the Due Process Clause,
5 and Hanson v. Denckla.56 Tarango held
the Beh court relied on Tarango"
that the fact that the alleged tort may have been completed in New Mexico
is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on a New Mexico court because the
minimum contact requirement of the Due Process Clause must also be
met.57 The defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the
forum so that hailing the defendant into court will not offend traditional
58
notions of fair play and substantial justice. Hanson defines the activity
as "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Beh, 657 F.Supp. at176, n.3.
99 N.M. 129, 654 P.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1982).
Beh, 657 F.Supp. at176, n.3.
Moore, 99 N.M. at131, 654 P.2d at584.
83 N.M. 469, 493 P.2d 954 (1972).
102 N.M. 56, 691 P.2d 57 (1984).
Beh, 657 F.Supp. at176 n.3.
Id. at 176.
Id.
Id. at 177.
94 N.M. 727, 616 P.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1980).
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
94 N.M. at 728, 616 P.2d at 441.
International Shoe Co. v.State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws." 59
The Beh court reasoned that performing an operation in California does
not constitute "purposefully availing oneself of the privilege of conducting activities" within New Mexico.rThe court looked to Tarango,
which stated that when one seeks out professional services which are
personal in nature, and travels to the locality, one must realize that the
services are directed to the needy person and not to a particular place. 6'
The Tarango court concluded that while it is true that if services are
negligently rendered, the consequences will be felt wherever the patient
goes, it is unfair to permit a suit in whatever distant jurisdiction the
patient may go. 6"
Therefore, the Beh court held that in order to establish in personam
jurisdiction, the plaintiff must allege some act which satisfies the minimum contacts requirement in order to confer jurisdiction on any court,
state or federal, in New Mexico.63 Beh alleged that Dr. Ostergard published articles that circulated in New Mexico which were directly related
to the improper research and experimentation he conducted by implanting
I.U.D.'s in Ms. Beh and others. 64 It was further alleged that Dr. Ostergard
could have expected to benefit professionally by having his articles read
by colleagues in New Mexico and he also benefited monetarily from A.H.
Robins Co. for doing research using their product, and gaining it national
attention. 65
The Beh court, citing Jones v. 3M Company,' s found these contacts
insufficient.6" The Jones decision required that the defendants do some
act to purposefully avail themselves of the laws of the forum as a basis
for personal jurisdiction.68 The Jones court held that the publication of
information that fortuitously finds its way into this forum is not such an
act.69 To obtain personal jurisdiction based on publication of information,
the plaintiff must allege that the defendant had a regular distribution plan
for his publication into New Mexico from which he derived commercial
59. 357 U.S. at 253.
60. 657 F. Supp. at 177.
61. 94 N.M. at 729, 616 P.2d at 442 (quoting Gelineau v. New York Univ. Hosp., 375 F. Supp.
661 (D.N.J. 1974)).
62. Id.
63. Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 177.
64. Id. at 177-78.
65. Id. at 178.
66. 107 F.R.D. 202, 207 (D.N.M. 1984).
67. 657 F. Supp. at 178.
68. 107 F.R.D. at 207.
69. Id.
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benefit,7 ° or that the defendant intentionally harmed or defamed the plaintiff in New Mexico by publishing the article.' Thus, the Beh court applied
these standards, determined that it could not exert personal jurisdiction,
72
and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.
D. The Beh Opinion Raises FurtherQuestions Regarding Personal
Jurisdiction.
Beh left unanswered some questions concerning personal jurisdiction.
The court, in a footnote, stated that the Board of Regents arguably could
be considered "present" in New Mexico because they transacted business
and owned property within the state.73 In that situation, the plaintiff need
not use the long-arm statute, but could effect service on the agent7 within
the state and thus obtain general jurisdiction over the defendant. "
This raises the question of whether the court has an obligation to exert
personal jurisdiction over a defendant before the court when the plaintiff
has alleged the wrong grounds for personal jurisdiction. The Beh court
did not address this issue other than to state that the plaintiff had relied
on extra-territorial jurisdiction, and the court must accordingly ignore
75
allegations of acts not specifically enumerated in the long-arm statute.
The court is not an investigative body, and if the plaintiff does not bring
forth the proper grounds for personal jurisdiction with specific facts to
support the claim, the burden on the court to research unargued issues
on which no facts are presented would be too great. In the instant case,
had the plaintiff alleged personal jurisdiction over the University of California because of presence in the state, and effected service of process
upon its agent in New Mexico, the court might have concluded there was
general jurisdiction and then would have had to address the immunity
issue. 76
Another issue that would have arisen had the plaintiff alleged general
jurisdiction is whether a cause of action must arise out of some contacts
with the state. A New Mexico case, Holly Creek Mills, states that when
70. See Blount v. T.D. Publishing Corp., 77 N.M. 384, 389, 423 P.2d 421, 426 (1966). Blount
held that a regular distribution plan with commercial benefit to the non-resident was sufficient contact
to satisfy the due process requirement and subject the defendants to the jurisdiction of New Mexico
Courts.
71. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-91 (1984). Calder held that personal jurisdiction
was proper in a libel suit when intentional harm resulted from publication of an article within the
state.
72. Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 178, 180.
73. Id. at 175 n.2.
74. Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
75. Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 175 n.2.
76. The immunity issue was raised by defendants. Finding no personal jurisdiction, however, the
Beh court did not reach the immunity issue with respect to the University of California. Id. at 174.
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personal jurisdiction is based on the long-arm statute, the cause of action
must arise out of the acts alleged to meet minimum contacts with the
forum.77 In Holly Creek Mills, the plaintiff relied on the "transaction of
any business" provision in the long-ann statute as a basis for personal
jurisdiction.78 The question, however, arises whether there is a constitutional due process question at all when an out of state university is sued
in New Mexico after it is found to be "present" in New Mexico. There
is no New Mexico case law on this issue, and Beh does not address this
question. Theoretically, there would be no due process analysis required
because of the University of California's transaction of business and
ownership of property within the state. These activities would conceivably
make it "present" in the state. Moore likewise supports the notion that
the cause of action would not have to arise out of the activity within the
state as long as there are other sufficient contacts with the state.79 However,
both Holly Creek Mills and Moore are cases in which personal jurisdiction
was based on the New Mexico long-arm statute rather than general jurisdiction, and neither case addressed the question presented here.
In deciding this case, the Beh court relied very heavily on Tarango.8 °
The court stated that the defendant's case was indistinguishable from
Tarango, "a leading case in this jurisdiction since 1980. "8 While Tarango
is on point with Beh, it is a state court of appeals opinion,82 and not
definitive on a federal constitutional issue.
Three months after Beh was decided, the New Mexico Supreme Court
decided Valley Wide Health Services, Inc. v. Graham.8" In Graham, the
plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against a Colorado health care
clinic.84 The plaintiff, a New Mexico resident, took his daughter to Colorado to the clinic.85 The doctor diagnosed a virus, and prescribed cold
baths, aspirin and Tylenol. 86 Two days later, the plaintiff called the clinic
to advise the doctor that his daughter's temperature was high and she
had begun to vomit.87 The doctor was not there to receive the call but
returned the call to the plaintiff's residence in New Mexico.88 The doctor
advised the plaintiff that the virus was running its course and to continue
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

83 N.M. at 472, 493 P.2d at 957.
Id. at 471, 493 P.2d at 956.
99 N.M. at 131, 654 P.2d at 584.
94 N.M. 727, 616 P.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1980).
Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 180.
Tarango, 94 N.M. 727, 616 P.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1980).
106 N.M. 71, 738 P.2d 1316 (1987).
Id. at 72, 738 P.2d at 1317.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the recommended treatment.89 The next day, the daughter died of peritonitis, secondary to pneumonia.'
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. 9' The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that
as a result of the doctor/patient relationship formed in Colorado, the doctor
was compelled to make the telephone call to the plaintiff at his home in
New Mexico.9 This single act of returning the plaintiff's telephone call
to New Mexico was sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on the New
Mexico court. 93

The supreme court reversed the court of appeals94 and used the same
95
three part analysis used in Tarango and Beh: There is personal jurisdiction in New Mexico if (1) the defendant did one of the acts enumerated
in the long-arm statute; (2) the plaintiff's cause of action arose from that
act; and (3) the defendant had minimum contacts with New Mexico
sufficient to satisfy constitutional due process.' The supreme court held
97
that the doctor did not "purposefully initiate" activity in the state. The
single phone call lacked the purposefulness of defendant's contact which
is demanded by due process.98
. The Graham opinion is the next step beyond Tarango and Beh. Rather
than mail bills into the state as in Tarango, or publish research in the
state, as in Beh, the Graham court had to decide whether a returned phone
call was an act in which the doctor purposefully availed himself of the
law of the forum.9 It is unlikely that had the supreme court decided
Graham before the federal court decided Beh, that the Beh decision would
have been different. However, one wonders how the Beh court would
have decided Graham had they been faced with those facts. Graham
clearly goes further than Tarango in establishing contact with the forum
state.
Beh, therefore, is consistent with a subsequent New Mexico Supreme
Court opinion in a case involving a tortious act within the New Mexico
long-arm statute.' °° Both the United States District Court and the New
Mexico Supreme Court recognized that some act in which the defendant
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 73, 738 P.2d at 1318.
95. Id. at 72-73, 738 P.2d at 1317-18.
96. Id. The first two elements are found in the New Mexico long-arm statute. The third element
is a federal law requirement.
97. Id. at 73, 738 P.2d at 1318.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 72-73, 738 P.2d at 1317-18.
100. See Valley Wide Health Services, Inc. v. Graham, 106 N.M. 71, 738 P.2d 1316 (1987).
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purposefully initiated activity within the state is required to exert personal
jurisdiction. ,' Although this is a federal due process requirement and not
a requirement under the New Mexico long-arm statute, both federal and
state courts must address the issue. The New Mexico courts, however,
are not in agreement as to what types of activities meet the minimum
contacts requirement needed to exert personal jurisdiction over an out of.
state defendant. ,02
E. The Case Was Dismissed Rather than Transferred to the Proper
Forum.
Although under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(2) a court
should generally dismiss actions when it cannot exercise in personam
jurisdiction over the defendant, plaintiffs often move the court under 28
U.S.C. Section 1404(a) to transfer the case to a forum which has jurisdiction. °3 The federal statute 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a) provides for
transfer:
(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought. 4
The Beh court raised and decided the issue of whether the court can
transfer under Section 1404(a) if it determines that it does not have
personal jurisdiction over the defendants.' 5 Neither the United States
Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit has considered the issue."0 The
majority of courts in other circuits and districts, however, hold that lack
of personal jurisdiction does not preclude transfer under Section 1404(a). °7
101. Id. at 73, 738 P.2d at 1318; Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 177-78.
102. The court of appeals in Graham held that the single act of returning a phone call from
Colorado to New Mexico was sufficient for personal jurisdiction. Graham v. Valley Wide Health
Services, Inc., No. 8602 (N.M. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1987). The supreme court reversed the decision
and held that the phone call did not "purposefully initiate" activity in the state, "thus invoking the
benefits and protections" of New Mexico laws, which is demanded by due process. Graham, 106
N.M. at 73, 738 P.2d at 1318.
103. See infra note 104.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) concerns the transfer of a case from a forum of proper venue to another
forum of proper venue. Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 178-79 n.6. The Beh court determined that venue was
proper in New Mexico and 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) applied. Id.
105. 657 F Supp. at 178.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 164-65 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'don other
grounds, 454 U.S. 235 (1982); Torres v. Torres, 603 F. Supp. 440, 442 (D.N.Y. 1985); Welsh v.
Cunard Lines, Ltd., 595 F. Supp. 844, 845 (D. Ariz. 1984); Stevens Yachts of Annapolis, Inc. v.
American Yacht Charters, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 467, 468 (D. Pa. 1983); Koehring Co. v. Hyde Constr.
Co., 324 F.2d 295, 297-98 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3rd
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 821 (1961). Contra Rhea v. Muskogee Gen. Hosp., 454 F. Supp.
40, 43 (E.D. Okla. 1978)).
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The Beh court also considered 28 U.S.C. Section 1406(a) which reads:
(a) The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying
venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in
the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division
in which it could have been brought. '"
The Beh court"° considered the United States Supreme Court ruling
°
on 28 U.S.C. Section 1406(a) in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman," and was
persuaded by a United States district court interpretation of that ruling in
Rhea v. Muskogee General Hospital.'" In Goldlawr, the Supreme Court
held the purpose of transfer was "avoiding the injustice which had often
resulted to plaintiffs from dismissal of their actions merely because they
had made an erroneous guess with regard to the existence of some elusive
fact."" 2 The Goldlawr Court further held that a mistake as to an "elusive
fact of minimum contacts" necessary to support personal jurisdiction3
mandates transfer to a forum where jurisdiction could be obtained."
Dismissal was held to be inappropriate when the result would cause the
plaintiff to lose its cause of action under the statute of limitations merely
because of a mistake. 114
Rhea interpreted Goldlawr in a case where the plaintiff knew or should
have known that service of process could not have been effected over the
plaintiff in the district where suit was filed. ' The Beh court relied on
Rhea when it stated that the plaintiff must reasonably and in good faith
believe that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant in order
to avoid dismissal." 6 The Beh court held that in the interest of justice it
was persuaded to dismiss rather than transfer the plaintiff's claim to the
proper federal district court in California. "'
The Beh case is distinguishable from Rhea in that the plaintiff in Rhea
knew and admitted that no personal jurisdiction existed in the district. , 8
The Beh court admitted this distinction but stated that the Beh case fell
between Goldlawrand Rhea. "' The Beh court stated that unlike Goldlawr,
the plaintiff in Beh had not made a reasonable mistake as to some elusive
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) concerns the transfer of a case from a forum of improper venue to a
forum of proper venue. Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 178-79 n.6.
109. 657 F. Supp. at 179.
110. 369 U.S. 463 (1962).
Ill. 454 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Okla. 1978).
112. 369 U.S. at 466.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 179 (quoting Rhea, 454 F. Supp. at 43).
116. 657 F. Supp. at 179.
117. Id. at 180.
118. 454 F. Supp. at 42.
119. 657 F. Supp. at 179.
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fact."2

Further, the Beh court cited twenty five years of case law which
clarified the concept of minimum contacts since Goldlawr was decided
in 1962.121 On the assumption that Tarango was the ruling autliority in
New Mexico and indistinguishable from Beh, the court found that there
was no elusive fact in this case with respect to personal jurisdiction., 22
New Mexico courts have held that the question of minimum contacts
should be decided on a case-by-case basis.' 2 3 There is no uniform understanding of the minimum contacts requirement by the New Mexico
courts, as evidenced by the court of appeals' and supreme court's opposite
jurisdictional rulings in Graham. 24 Combined with inconsistent rulings
is uncertainty with regard to what extent the New Mexico long-arm statute
meets the federal due process/minimum contacts requirement. 25 Beh and
Tarango are good examples of cases which meet the two requirements
of the long-arm statute, but fail to meet the federal minimum contacts
requirement.' 26 Conversely, it may be possible to meet the minimum
contacts requirement and not meet the requirements of the New Mexico
long-arm statute. For example, if the defendant does not commit an act
which is enumerated in the long-arm statute or if the cause of action does
not arise from that act, the long-arm statute requirements will not be met
regardless of other minimum contacts with the state.

27

1

It is apparent that

the law is not well settled in New Mexico and that there is still confusion
over the minimum contacts analysis in personal jurisdiction.
A broad interpretation of Goldlawr would result in a case being transferred regardless of whether it was reasonable for the plaintiff to file suit
in the improper district. ' This standard encourages the plaintiff to seek
the most favorable forum for his or her cause, knowing that the court
will transfer rather than dismiss the claim. For example, if the statute of
limitations has run in the proper forum, the plaintiff could file in an
improper forum and request a transfer under Goldlawr.29
' The transferee
state must then determine which state law to apply.' 30 If it applies the
120. Id.
121. Id. at 180 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)).
122. 657 F. Supp. at 180.
123. Holly Creek Mills, 83 N.M. at 472, 493 P.2d at 957.
124. 106 N.M. at 72, 738 P.2d at 1317.
125. Id. at 72, 73, 738 P.2d at 1317, 1318.
126. Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 176-78; Tarango, 94 N.M. at 728, 616 P.2d at 441.
127. N.M. STAT. ANN. §38-1-16 (1978).
128. 369 U.S. at 466-67.
129. Id.
130.
Under Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), a court
ordinarily must apply the choice-of-law rules of the State in which it sits.
However, where a case is transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), it must
apply the choice-of-law rules of the State from which the case was transferred.
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1946). ...
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 234, 243 n.8 (1981).
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statute of limitations of the transferor state, it will hear a case that could
not have been filed initially in the transferee state. 131
That is exactly what happened on the same day Beh was decided. The
United States District Court in New York decided Smith v. Morris &
Manning'32 and held that the district court had power to transfer a legal
malpractice action even though it lacked personal jurisdiction over the
defendants.' 33 Following Goldlawr,34
' the court held that in order to promote adjudication on the merits, venue statutes must be construed to
authorize transfer of cases lacking personal jurisdiction, however wrong
the plaintiff has been in his choice of forum.'35 The possibility that the
claim was time-barred under Georgia law and that the plaintiff was "forum
shopping" did not dictate dismissal. While some courts deny transfer and
dismiss the claim if it is time-barred in the transferee state, the court
reasoned the better practice is to transfer because the transferee court may
choose to apply the statute of limitations of the transferee state. 36
' The
court concluded that it was preferable to leave the statute of limitations
question to the transferee court in Georgia, and transferred the case in
the interest of justice. '
Rhea, on the other hand, requires a good faith belief and a reasonable
mistake to allow a transfer rather than a dismissal. 38
' If a case is dismissed
after the statute of limitations has run in the proper district, plaintiffs lose
their day in court. 13 The Beh court stated that the claim of personal
jurisdiction in New Mexico was made in good faith, but was not a
reasonable mistake in light of the case law."4° Because the statute of
limitations had run in California, where personal jurisdiction was proper,
the plaintiff lost her right to obtain personal jurisdiction in the only
remaining forum by the dismissal of the case in New Mexico. This is a
harsh result for a plaintiff who has brought a claim for personal jurisdiction
in good faith. The above cases demonstrate that the jurisdictions are split
on the question of when transfer should be allowed.
Perhaps twenty five years of federal case law on minimum contacts is
well settled. New Mexico case law, however, is less clear. Given the
policy of deciding the minimum contacts question on a case-by-case basis,
it is questionable whether plaintiffs are unreasonable in bringing suits in
federal district court. As late as 1987, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
held that one phone call was enough to establish minimum contact suf131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 466.
657 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Id.at 181.
369 U.S. at 466-67.
Morris & Manning, 657 F. Supp. at 181.
Id. at 182.
Id.
454 F. Supp. at 42-43.
Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 466.
657 F. Supp. at 179.
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ficient to exercise personal jurisdiction.' 4' Because the supreme court
reversed this decision,142 it is still apparent that a lack of consensus among
New Mexico courts creates continued confusion for the New Mexico bar.
Opinions such as Beh will help to clarify the concept within the framework
of New Mexico law, but the decision is incorrect in holding that a mistake
about minimum contacts is unreasonable.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States District Court, District of New Mexico, succeeded
in providing New Mexico state courts with a clear and persuasive application of New Mexico law on personal jurisdiction. The court discussed
and clarified the two elements of personal jurisdiction using the New
Mexico long-arm statute.' 43 In addition, the court recognized a third
element: the federal due process/minimum contacts requirement must be
satisfied. '
The requirements of the long-arm statute are first, the defendant must
have committed one of the enumerated acts in the long-arm statute and
second, the cause of action must arise out of one of the enumerated
acts.'5 Beh applied New Mexico case law, which recognizes that a tort
'
occurs when an injury occurs. 46
The federal due process/minimum contacts requirement is the third
element.' 7 The defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with
the forum so that hailing him into court will not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.' 4 8 The court analyzed New Mexico
and federal case law in conjunction with the facts of Beh to determine
whether the court could assert personal jurisdiction in this case.
The plaintiff in Beh established that the requirements of the long-arm
statute had been met. ' The tortious act had been committed in New
Mexico, because the injury occurred in New Mexico.' 50 Also, the cause
of action arose out of the commission of that act. '' However, the de141. Graham, 106 N.M. at 72, 738 P.2d at 1317.
142. Id. at 73, 738 P.2d at 1318.
143. Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 174-78.
144. Id. at 174. The Beh court stated there are three elements of personal jurisdiction in New
Mexico. Id. However, the New Mexico long-arm statute contains two elements. The third element
is a federal law requirement.
145. Id.at 174.
146. Tarango, 94 N.M. at 728, 616 P.2d at 441; see Peralta v. Martinez, 90 N.M. 391, 564 P.2d
194 (Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 485 (1977).
147. Beh, 657 F. Supp. at 174.
148. Id. at 177.
149. Id. at 176.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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fendant's contacts with New Mexico were found to be insufficient for the
purpose of protecting the defendant's due process rights. 52 The court
held that publication of the results of research was insufficient to meet
the minimum
contacts requirement to exert personal jurisdiction over the
53
defendant.

1

After determining that personal jurisdiction was not proper in New
Mexico, the case was dismissed rather than transferred to the proper
forum.

54

The plaintiff lost her opportunity to obtain personal jurisdiction

in the proper forum. This result seems harsh in light of the confusion in
New Mexico law.
While the opinion does not answer all questions on personal jurisdiction, it is clearly written and clarifies the complex and apparently
inconsistent New Mexico law. The federal district court decision was
consistent with past and subsequent New Mexico case law and the federal
due process/minimum contacts requirement. '5' This opinion will not be
binding on New Mexico state courts, but is persuasive in clarifying and
simplifying New Mexico law on personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants.
SUE ANN SLATES

152. Id. at 178.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 180.
155. See Valley Wide Health Services, Inc. v. Graham, 106 N.M. 71, 738 P.2d 1316 (1987);
Winward v. Holly Creek Mills, Inc., 83 N.M. 469, 493 P.2d 954 (1972), Tarango v. Pastrana, 94
N.M. 727, 616 P.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1980). See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

